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Abstract
Understanding data variability and potential error sources
is essential to a full understanding of experimental science.
We propose a typology of error that considers not only the
nature of the error, but also the phase in the experiment in
which it occurs.  We looked at second- and fourth-grade
children’s understanding of error, their use of evidence in
guiding this understanding, and the role of context in
reasoning about error.  We found that children could name
and recognize sources of error even when they were unable
to design controlled experiments.  Children used evidence
to guide their reasoning, making predictions and drawing
conclusions based on the design of their experiments.
Children were also sensitive to the context of reasoning:
they differentiated the role of random error in relative and
absolute measurements.  These findings suggest that
children understand a wide variety of potential error
sources several years before they have acquired the
systematic procedures necessary to control and interpret
such error
A student in a fourth grade science laboratory is
attempting to determine the effect of different factors on
how far a ball rolls down a ramp.  The ramp is adjustable
for length, height, and surface smoothness, and there are
two types of balls.  Distance is measured by counting the
number of discrete “steps” the ball travels up a sloped
staircase at the end of the ramp.  The teacher’s primary
instructional goal is to have the child learn how to design
unconfounded experiments, in which experimental
contrasts differing on only one attribute support logically
grounded causal inferences.
In an ideal world, the student could demonstrate an
understanding of experimental design by setting up two
ramps such that they differed only with respect to surface
type, releasing two identical balls, and observing that the
ball on the smoother ramp went faster.
But the world is not ideal, and many unanticipated,
unknown, and unintended events could influence the
outcome of this experiment.  Perhaps the student does not
fully understand the logic of unconfounded
experimentation, and so varies more than one factor at a
time.  Perhaps one ball is pushed slightly at the start of its
roll or hits the side of the ramp on the way down.  Perhaps
one ball rolls back a few steps at the end of the run and
the true distance it rolled is lost.  Perhaps none of these
"obvious" things occur, but, upon repeating the
experiment several times, the student discovers that the
balls travel different distances on each replication.  What
is the student to conclude?
Each of these events can be considered as a different
type of experimental error.  Among philosophers of
science the question of how to best classify different types
of experimental error remains controversial.  The
"conventional" view is that there is a true value and an
error term that is part of the observed measurement, and it
is distinguishing the magnitude of each that is the difficult
part (cf., Hon, 1989).  Quite a different perspective – and
the one adopted in our analysis – is a process-based view
that recognizes the inevitability of errors and that
classifies them according to when in the overall cycle of
experimental investigation they occur.  Hon (1989) has
proposed such a taxonomy and used it to organize a wide
range of historical cases in which error played an
important role in the scientific discovery process.  We
have adapted his approach by combining it with an
earlier, psychologically oriented, classification of error
(Toth & Klahr, 1999) to produce a similar taxonomy with
which to organize some of the psychological literature on
children's understanding of error, and to motivate our own
investigations.  In our taxonomy, there are five relatively
distinct stages to the experimentation process (design, set-
up, execution, measurement, and analysis of results), and
each stage is associated with a category of error.
Types of Error in Designing and Executing
Experiments
Design error  This type of error occurs during the earliest
conceptual phase of an experiment when some variables
not being tested are not controlled and a confounded
design is produced.  For example, if the goal is to
determine the effect of different ramp surfaces, then an
experiment that compares a high smooth ramp with a low
rough ramp contains a design error.  No matter what the
outcome of the test, it will be unclear whether any
differences in the distance the balls rolled are due to the
different steepnesses or different surfaces.  Design errors
occur "in the head" rather than "in the world" because
they result from cognitive failures: either from a failure to
fully understand the logic of unconfounded contrasts, or
from inadequate domain knowledge.
Execution error  These errors occur when something not
considered or planned for in the design influences the
outcome.  Execution error can be random (such that
replications can average out its effects) or biased (such
that the direction of influence is the same on repeated
trials), and it may be obvious (such as hitting the side of
the ramp) or unobserved (such as an imperfection in the
ball).
Measurement error   This type of error overlaps the set-
up and the measurement phases, because measurement is
involved in setting up the apparatus and calibrating
instruments as well as in assessing outcomes.
Interpretation error  Interpretation errors can occur at
any phase in the experiment.  If an error occurs in any of
the phases and is not recognized as such, it can influence
the interpretation.  The analysis phase involves both
statistical analysis and theoretical inference, both of
which are subject to a wide variety of statistical and
cognitive errors.  Errors that involve ascribing effects
when in fact there are none, or claiming a null effect when
one actually exists fall into this category.
Children’s Understanding of Experimental Error
Although there is only a small philosophical literature on
experimental error, there is an even smaller literature on
the psychology of experimental error, i.e., empirical
investigations of how people understand and interpret
various kinds of experimental error.  In this section we
briefly summarize what is known about children’s
understanding of error.  The terminology and methods of
investigation in these developmental studies are quite
varied, making it difficult to compare their results, but we
summarize them in terms of the classificatory scheme
presented earlier.
Several of the studies of grade school children’s error
understanding have focused on how children reason about
repeated measurements and data variability.  Varelas
(1997) looked at third and fourth grade children’s
reasoning about repeated measurements when they carried
out experiments in groups.  She found that most children
expected some variability in measurements, though why
they expected this variability was not always clear.
Avoiding an error in the interpretation phase involves
assessing when an error is sizeable enough to affect
conclusions.  Schauble (1996) looked at fifth and sixth
graders, and non-college adults.  One difficulty many
children (and some adults) had was in distinguishing
variation due to errors in measuring the results from
variation due to true differences between the conditions
(i.e., between intended contrasts and measurement phase
errors).  When in doubt, participants tended to fall back
on their prior theories.  If they expected a variable to have
an effect, they interpreted variability as a true effect;
otherwise, they were more likely to interpret the
variability as due to error.
Lubben and Millar (1996) found that some high school
children still have considerable difficulty understanding
data variability, at least in situations in which they are
given the data but are not performing the experiments
themselves.
Error is a difficult concept to understand, and it seems
likely that there are several levels of understanding
(Lubben & Millar, 1996).  There is evidence that first and
second grade children can recognize a good experiment,
even when they cannot yet generate one (Sodian,
Zaitchik, & Carey, 1991).  This finding suggests that
children who are unable to generate error-related reasons
for data variability may still have a basic understanding of
error and therefore be able to recognize error-based
explanations as plausible.
Causal Reasoning and Error Understanding
One way to clarify this literature about error is to
reconceptualize error as a subset of the more fundamental
topic of causal reasoning.  Whether we recognize it as
error or not, error is always caused by something.  As
suggested by the taxonomy proposed here, the nature of
that something may be different for each phase of the
experimental cycle.  From this perspective, before one can
reason about error in science experiments, it is necessary
to be able to reason about causes  (Koslowski & Masnick,
in press).
In the current study, we set out to explore several
aspects of children’s understanding of error: their
understanding and recognition of different types of error;
consistency of reasoning about experimental design and
conclusions, the ability to differentiate between the
importance of error when comparing relative and absolute
measurements; and the use of theory and evidence in
justifications for confidence.
We know that children often have difficulty designing
controlled experiments (e.g., Chen & Klahr, 1999).
However, it is unclear how much they do understand and
whether they can reason consistently based on their
incorrect designs.  If when children design confounded
experiments, they make predictions about the outcome
based on variables other than the target variable, it would
suggest that although they do not fully understand the
goals of the experiment, they use background knowledge
to reason correctly based on the experiment they have
designed.
Another measure of understanding is children’s
confidence about conclusions.  If they understand the
importance of a good design, we would expect them to be
more confident of conclusions based on the results of an
unconfounded experiment than a confounded one.  At a
more sophisticated level, if children understand the role of
random error, they may still not be completely confident
of outcomes after just one or two runs of an
unconfounded test.  They may consider that there are
often uncontrollable factors that can affect a result and, by
extension, the conclusions drawn.
The question of when error is important enough to alter
conclusions is a difficult one.  When looking at simple
mechanics problems, the question also depends on the
experimental context.  If the goal is to determine the exact
distance a ball will roll down a ramp under certain
conditions, even the slightest unintended intrusion can
raise questions about the result.  But when the goal is to
compare the relative distance a ball rolls given two levels
of a particular variable, if the difference is sizeable, error
is less important.
We designed a study to address several aspects of
children’s understanding of error throughout all phases of
an experiment, to examine what elementary school
children know about different types of error.  First, we
looked at whether children can design unconfounded
experiments, make predictions consistent with their
designs, and differentiate the role of error in absolute and
relative measurements?  Next, we looked at whether
children generate alternative reasons for variation in
repeated measurements, considering the roles of
execution and measurement errors.  Finally, we looked at
whether children recognize potential sources of error.
Method
Participants Participants were 29 second-grade (mean
age = 8.1) and 20 fourth-grade (mean age = 10.1) children
from a private elementary school in southwestern
Pennsylvania.
Materials Materials included two wooden ramps, each
with an adjustable downhill track connected at its lower
end to a slightly uphill, "staircase" surface.  Children
could set three binary variables to configure each ramp:
the height  (high or low), by using wooden blocks that fit
under the ramps; the surface (rough or smooth), by
placing inserts on the downhill tracks; and the length of
the downhill ramp (long or short), by placing gates at
either of two starting positions. Finally, children could
choose either a rubber ball or a golf ball to roll down
either ramp.
In addition, a laminated copy of a scale for indicating
confidence (see below) and a stopwatch were used.
Procedure
 Children were interviewed individually.  All interviews
were videotaped for later coding and analysis.  During a
brief familiarization phase, children were introduced to
the ramp materials and the confidence scale (called a
“sureness” scale, with levels of totally sure, pretty sure,
kind of sure, and not so sure) and were asked a few
questions to ensure that they understood how to use all of
the materials.
Part One  The purpose of Part One was to determine the
extent to which children could design unconfounded
experiments with these materials, and to assess their
ability to differentiate between absolute and relative
measurements. Each child was asked to design four
experiments to determine the effect of different settings
for specific variables that might affect how far a ball rolls
down a ramp.  In the first two experiments, children were
asked to set up the ramps to test whether the steepness of
the ramp made a difference in the outcome; in the third
and fourth experiments, they were asked to test the effect
of surface.
After the child set up the ramps, the experimenter asked
why the ramps had been set up that way and also asked
which ball was expected to go farther and why.  Next, the
experimenter asked the child to release both gates at the
same time to see how far the balls rolled.
After the balls had stopped rolling, the experimenter
asked the child what he/she had learned and why.  Next,
the experimenter asked the child whether the target
variable (steepness or surface) made a difference.  The
child used the sureness scale to indicate confidence that
the particular variable did make a difference, and to
explain why.
Next, the experimenter asked a series of questions
about relative and absolute values of the outcome
variable.  The experimenter asked the child to imagine, if
the identical experiment were to be repeated, whether the
same ball would go farther, and then whether the two
balls would be expected to land on the exact same steps.
The children were then asked to rate their sureness about
each answer and explain why.
After each experiment and question series, the ramps
were disassembled and the child was asked to set up the
next experiment.
Part Two The purpose of this part was to explore the
child's understanding of data variability in replicated
experiments.  A single ramp was set up with a high
steepness, smooth surface, long run, and a golf ball.  For
each of five trials, the child was instructed to release the
ball by lifting the gate on the experimenter's signal, while
the experimenter simultaneously started a stopwatch.
When the ball reached the bottom of the ramp (but before
it began to roll up the steps), the experimenter stopped the
stopwatch and read out a time for the child to record by
writing it down.  To ensure that all children were
presented with the same range of data, the experimenter
reported a fixed, predetermined set of times to each child,
regardless of the actual time on the stopwatch1.
At the completion of the five trials, the experimenter
noted that it appeared to take a different amount of time
for each roll and asked the child to generate reasons to
explain these differences.  Each child was encouraged to
give as many reasons as he or she could think of, and then
was asked for a summary explanation he or she would
provide the teacher if she asked how long it took.
The experimenter then changed the surface of the ramp
to a rough surface, and the ball was again rolled down
five times.  Again, the experimenter read each child an
identical list of run durations. In this second round of
numbers, there was a noticeable outlier among the
numbers given2.  After the five trials were completed, the
experimenter again asked the child for reasons why the
numbers would come out differently and a summary for
the teacher.
Part Three  Whereas Part Two required children to
generate potential sources of error, in Part Three a few
such sources were provided, to see how well children
                                                
1
  Times: 1.08, 1.20. 1.15, 1.02, 1.17; mean = 1.12, sd = 0.07
2
  Times: 1.90, 2.48, 1.88, 1.95, 1.85; mean = 2.01, sd = 0.26
could reason about their possible influence.  Questions
about both relative and absolute differences were asked.
The experimenter explained that she had been working
with some children at another school who were trying to
figure out whether run length made a difference.  She
demonstrated their situation by presenting the two ramps
set up as an unconfounded experiment comparing the
short and long run length, with both ramps having high
steepness, smooth surfaces, and rubber balls.
The experimenter then asked about three scenarios the
students had encountered: 1) one ball hit the side of the
ramp on the way down; 2) the two balls were released at
different times instead of simultaneously; 3) one ball
rolled back a few steps before anyone could record how
far it went. Note that scenarios 1 and 3 might be expected
to affect both relative and absolute outcomes, while
scenario 2 was designed as a control question because it
should not effect on the outcome.  For each, the
experimenter asked the child whether the event described
could affect how far the ball went, and whether it could
change which ball went farther.
Results
Experimental Design Skills
Children’s experimental design skills were assessed by
looking at the number of correct (unconfounded)
experiments designed. A correct design contrasted the
target variable while holding the other three variables
constant.  This assessed their ability to avoid design phase
errors, and to demonstrate knowledge of the Control of
Variables Strategy (CVS).  We categorized two types of
incorrect designs: confounded (contrast of the target
factor and one or more other factors), or non-contrastive
(no contrast of the target factor). There was a significant
effect of grade on CVS performance, with second graders
averaging 16% unconfounded experiments, and fourth
graders averaging 40% (t(47) = 2.89; p = 0.006).
Predicting Experimental Outcomes
Children’s predictions about which ball would go farther
were coded as correct or incorrect.  (If the two balls
traveled the same number of steps, children were coded as
predicting incorrectly, unless they predicted a tie.)
Overall, children were extremely good at predicting the
outcomes of unconfounded experiments and significantly
less accurate when predicting the outcomes of non-
contrastive designs, as measured by Fisher’s exact tests of
association. 3  For all but the first experiment, there was a
strong relationship between predictive accuracy and type
of design (unconfounded, confounded, or non-
contrastive).  (See Table 1.) Children’s predictions were
                                                
3
 Six times children designed correct experiments but
inaccurately predicted the outcome.  These six comparisons all
occurred during the third experiment, a comparison of the
surfaces, in which either the two balls tied or the ball on the
rough surface actually rolled farther than the ball on the smooth
surface.
most accurate when they designed unconfounded
experiments, next most accurate when they designed
confounded experiments, and least accurate when they
designed non-contrastive experiments.  The relationship
was stronger for fourth graders than for second graders.









Expt. 1 10/10 28/32 5/7
Expt. 2** 9/9 20/27 5/13
Expt. 3* 12/18 16/21 3/10
Expt. 4** 14/14 14/21 6/14
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01
Explanations for Predictions
Children’s explanations for their predictions were coded
for mention of the target variable (steepness or surface),
non-target variables, and any prior outcomes.
To assess the consistency of responses, we examined
the relationship between children’s reasons for their
predictions and the type of experiment they designed
(unconfounded, confounded, or non-contrastive), using
Fisher’s exact tests of association.  For all four
experiments, there was a significant relationship between
mention of the target variable and the type of experiment
designed.  Overall, children mentioned the target variable
as an explanation for 92% of their unconfounded
experiments, 61% of their confounded experiments and
14% of their non-contrastive experiments.  When broken
down by grade, there is still a significant relationship at
both grade levels.  Similarly, there was a significant
relationship between type of experiment and mention of
the non-target variable.  Children said they based their
prediction on one or more of the non-target variables 6%
of the time when they designed unconfounded
experiments, 56% of the time when they designed
confounded experiments, and 61% of the time when they
designed non-contrastive experiments.
Confidence
Children’s responses to the questions, “Can you tell if X
makes a difference?” were coded as yes/no responses.
Children noted how sure they were of this answer by
using the four-level confidence scale.  Finally, children
explained why they chose the sureness value they did.
Nearly all of the children were “kind of sure,” “pretty
sure,” or “totally sure” about whether steepness makes a
difference on the first two experiments (98% and 86%)
and whether surface makes a difference on the third and
fourth experiments (90% and 86%).  Confidence was
unrelated to whether the test was unconfounded, as
assessed by Fisher’s exact tests of association (p > 0.10
for each of the four experiments), but there is some
evidence that it is related to the accuracy of prediction.
Four Fisher’s exact tests were performed to assess the
relationship between accuracy of prediction and
confidence in conclusions.  The trend was significant in
the third and fourth experiments.  In the first experiment,
not enough children were unsure to allow for a strong
comparison.  Children who correctly predicted the
outcome were more likely to be sure than those who
predicted incorrectly (See Table 2 for details).








Expt. 1 98% (42/43) 100%  (6/6) 1.000
Expt. 2 91% (31/34) 73%  (11/15) 0.179
Expt. 3 97% (30/31) 78%  (14/18) 0.054
Expt. 4 94% (32/34) 67%  (10/15) 0.022
Comparing Relative/Absolute Replications
For each question about whether the same ball would go
farther if the experiment were to be repeated, children
first answered yes or no, and then rated their confidence.
These two responses – yes/no and confidence level – were
combined into a single 7-point ordinal variable, ranging
from totally sure the same ball would not go farther to
totally sure it would go farther, with not so sure as the
midpoint.  An analogous coding scheme was used for the
questions about whether the balls would land in the exact
same positions.
The reasons given for why children expected the same
or a different outcome were coded for mention of any of a
list of common responses, including the fact that nothing
had changed, and the effect of the target variable (e.g.,
“This one is the steeper ramp so that will make it go
farther”).
When asked whether the same ball would go farther
were the experiment repeated without changes, over 90%
of the time children thought it would (i.e., they said that
they were kind of sure, pretty sure, or totally sure that it
would).  This figure excludes cases in which the balls
traveled the same distance.  The expectations about
whether the balls would land in the exact same position
were more varied.  About 50% of the time, children
thought the two balls would not land in the same positions
again, about 40% of the time children thought they would,
and the remaining times they were unsure.
To test whether children had different expectations for
replication of relative and absolute outcomes, scores from
the 7-point confidence code for absolute replication were
subtracted from the corresponding scores for relative
replication.  For each child, we computed the mean of this
difference score over the four experiments.  Children
were significantly more confident that the same ball
would go farther than that the two balls would land in
exactly the same place (mean difference = 2.46; sd = 1.76;
t (48) = 9.8; p < 0.001).  A t-test indicated a marginally
significant effect of grade (mean for 2nd grade = 2.1, 4th
grade = 3.0, t (47) = 1.95, p = 0.057).  Children had
different ideas about the importance of variation in the
data depending on whether the judgments were about
relative or absolute measurements.
Children’s reasons for confidence about relative
replication were nearly evenly divided: 40% were
evidence-based (e.g., “this ball went farther last time”),
and 45% theory-based (e.g., “this one will go farther
because it’s on the steeper ramp”).
Accounting for Variability in Replications
Children’s explanations for why the timing was different
for each of the five trials were coded for mention of
several factors, such as the child releasing the gate before
or after the experimenter said “go,” the experimenter
stopping or starting the stopwatch too early or late, or the
ball hitting the side of the ramp.  Coding agreement over
ten participants ranged from 85-100% on each code.
The average number of error sources named on the two
sets of trials was 1.48 by second-graders and 2.15 by
fourth-graders, a significant difference (t(46) = 2.73; p =
0.009).  General linear models examining whether ability
to design unconfounded experiments (as assessed by CVS
score) is related to ability to name error sources in this
second part indicate no relationship once grade is
controlled in the model (F (1, 45) = 1. 79, p = 0.19).
Hypothetical Scenarios
Responses to the questions about hypothetical scenarios
were classified into one of three categories: (1) yes, with
mechanism explanation; (2) yes, without mechanism
explanation; (3) no.
All participants correctly said that the ball hitting the
side and that the ball rolling back a few steps could
influence how far a ball went and whether the same ball
would go farther.  Eighty-eight percent were able to offer
a reason for the former, and 72% were able to offer a
reason for the latter.  For the question about whether the
timing of gate release would affect the distances traveled,
68% said that it would not and 4% offered a plausible
mechanism for why it might make a difference (e.g., the
vibration of the ramp might be different when a ball is
simultaneously rolling down a ramp right next to it).
Overall, 34% of children completely and accurately
answered all 6 questions.  Fifty percent of the fourth
graders and 22% of the second graders answered all the
questions correctly.
Generating Error Sources
At several points throughout the interview, children were
asked to think of reasons why experiments did not or
might not have the same results when repeated (e.g.,
explaining why the balls would not land in the same place
or why a ball rolled down the same ramp five times took a
different amount of time for each run).  The responses
were coded for mention of possible sources of error, such
as the ball hitting the side, or wind blowing, or the gates
being lifted different ways, as a reason for the variation in
results.  Eighty-eight percent of children were able to
name at least one source of error.  All six children who
did not name any sources of error were second-graders.
Discussion
We set out to examine children’s knowledge of different
error sources.  Our results indicate that despite children’s
difficulty in designing unconfounded experiments, they
do understand a lot about error and its importance.
As found in earlier studies (Chen & Klahr, 1999; Toth,
et al., 2000), children frequently made design errors (that
is., they had difficulty designing unconfounded
experiments).  However, children showed consistency in
their reasoning by referring to their design in justifying
their predictions, regardless of whether it was a good
experiment.
This evidence of consistency in justifications and
conclusions also indicates some causal reasoning abilities.
In the majority of cases, children recognized the link
between the design and the outcome by considering their
design to determine which factors would affect the
outcome, and which factors they could draw conclusions
about with confidence.
In addition, children’s prior theoretical knowledge
guided their reasoning.  They were more likely to be
confident about their conclusions when the evidence
matched their prior beliefs (their predictions), though they
were still confident more often than not, regardless of
their predictions. Children also justified most predictions
based on expected effects of the target and non-target
variables (though this reliance varied based on design).
Children also demonstrated some understanding of the
role of error in interpretation.  Even by the second grade,
children differentiated the importance of error in different
situations, recognizing that errors are much more likely to
affect measurements of exact positions than of relative
positions.  This finding may suggest a nascent
understanding of the difference between main effects and
specific examples.  Children's confidence that the relative
ordering would remain the same suggests they expect
main effects to be robust, whereas their lack of confidence
in absolute outcomes remaining the same suggests their
understanding of variability in each sample.
When reasoning about experiments with ramps,
children can use several different kinds of information.
They can use their domain knowledge, i.e., what they
know of the mechanics of friction and gravity, and of
other factors that might affect how a specific instrument
works.  They can also use any formal experimental
knowledge they have about what kinds of factors make
for a good experiment, such as how to avoid errors in all
phases of the experiment.  Domain-specific knowledge
enables them to name potential sources of error that could
affect the outcome, while domain-general knowledge
about experimental design encourages them to search for
these specific examples.
The fact that most children are able to name at least one
possible source of random error indicates that they do
have at least a rudimentary idea about how unpredictable
and uncontrolled factors can influence an experiment’s
outcome.  At the same time, the observation that most of
these same children are not consistently able to design
unconfounded experiments suggests that the
understanding is not complete at this age.  Knowledge
about this gap in understanding can lay the foundation for
future research about children’s knowledge of science
experimentation and about the most effective means to aid
science educators teaching children these skills.
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